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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JANE B. CARTER, also known as 
MRS. J. W. CARTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
GEORGES. SPENCER, GEORGE J. CANNON, 
LAURENCE E. ELLISON, JAMES E. ELLISON, 
MORRIS H. ELLISON, J. WM. KNIGHT, No. 8249 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and I r ·--
_!:":·; 
ELLISON RANCHING COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, and ELLISON RANCHING-~~ 
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.. }-~ 
COMPANY, a Nevada Corporation, ·~~. 
Defendants 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JANE B. CARTER, also known as 
MRS. J. W. CARTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
GEORGE S. SPENCER, GEORGE]. CANNON, 
LAURENCE E. ELLISON, JAMES E. ELLISON, 
MORRIS H. ELLISON, J. WM. KNIGHT, No. 8249 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
ELLISON RANCHING COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, and ELLISON RANCHING 
COMPANY, a Nevada Corporation, 
Defendants 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come now the appellants above named and petition the 
court for a hearing and reargument of the above cause upon 
the following grounds, to-wit: 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE 
MINUTES OF THE STOCKHOLDER'S MEETING WHICH 
AFFIRMATIVELY SHOW THAT THE RESPONDENT 
VOTED FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE ELLISON 
RANCHING COMPANY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S QUOTATION FROM THE RECORD 
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE STATEMENTS OF THE 
COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS UNWILLING TO 
ACCEPT STOCK IN THE NEW CORPORATION. 
POINT III 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSI-
TION THAT BY REASON OF THE CONDUCT OF 
RESPONDENT'S PROXY SHE IS STOPPED FROM 
QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE REORGANIZA-
TION. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DIRECTORS ARE LIABLE FOR THE ACTION TAKEN 
BY THE STOCKHOLDERS. 
POINT V 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE PURPOSE AND 
INTENT OF THE STIPULATION STATED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS THE SPECULATIVE VALUE 
OF THE CORPORATE ASSETS INSTEAD OF THE FAIR 
MARKET VALUE OF THE STOCK. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER PRAYS TI-IA T THE 
JUDGMENT AND OPINION OF THE COURT BE RE-
CALLED AND A REARGUMENT BE PERMITTED OF 
THE ENTIRE CASE. 
A BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION IS FILED 
HEREWITH. 
]. D. SKEEN 
F. R. BAYLE 
E.]. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Appellants and Petitioners 
E.]. SKEEN hereby certifies that he is one of the attorneys 
of record for the appellant and petitioner herein, and that in 
his opinion there is good cause to believe that the judgment 
and decision of the Court is erroneous and that the case should 
be reheard and reargued as prayed for in said Petition. 
Dated this 9th day of August, 1955. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellants sincerely urge that the Court has not fully 
considered the facts in this case and has ignored fundamental 
legal principles which are properly applicable. For example, 
on page 2 of the mimeographed opinion, the Court made the 
following statement and underlined it: 
that she (Jane B. Carter) stated her unwillingness to 
accept stock in the Nevada corporation for her stock 
in the Utah corporation." 
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The Court then states: 
((This finding of fact is supported by the following 
testimony of James W. Carter, plaintiff's proxy." 
The testimony of James W. Carter, quoted in the opinion, 
does not expressly or by implication, support the underlined 
statement of the Court. It merely is to the effect that the proxy 
declined to vote to subscribe to the articles of incorporation of 
the new corporation because the stock in the new corporation 
was assessable. The Court failed to point out in its opinion that 
the stock in the old corporation was like-wise assessable and ig-
nored the well settled law that declining to vote did not 
legally establish the position of respondent as a dissenting 
stockholder. The points briefly alluded to above and the other 
points stated in the petition for rehearing will be discussed 
under the following headings: 
1. The Court disregarded the minutes of the stockholders' 
meeting. 
2. The record does not support the Court's conclusion that 
the respondent was a dissenting stockholder. 
3. The Court did not consider the question of estoppel. 
4. The directors were not guilty of a breach of trust. 
5. The stipulation was misconstrued. 
6. The Court ignored the well settled law as to the measure 
of damages. 
POINT I 
THE COURT DISREGARDED THE MINUTES OF 
THE STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING. 
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. The special meeting of the stockholders to consider re-
organizing the Ellison Ranching Company under Nevada Law 
was held on May 29, 1952, at Layton, Utah. The official 
minutes of the meeting appear on pages 289 to 292 inclusive of 
the bound minute book, Exhibit P-8. Notes from which the 
minutes were prepared were taken by plaintiff's proxy, her son, 
James W. Carter. They were offered by defendant, marked P-2, 
and received in evidence. They are quoted on pages 6 and 7 
of appellants' brief. The notes, Exhibit P-2, and the part of 
the official minute book, Exhibit P -8, devoted to the meeting 
of May 29, 1952 are entirely consistent. They both show that 
plaintiff's proxy voted for the resolution attached to the notice 
of the meeting and the minutes. No dissenting vote fas recorded 
in the entire meeting. The only resolution upon which the 
plaintiff refrained from voting was the one relating to the 
form of articles of incorporation. The notes taken by Carter 
show the following: 
((Mr. Carter present but not voting on this resolution." 
This fact is recorded on page 292 of the official minute 
book. 
This Court has apparent! y given no weight to the official 
minutes of the meeting or to the notes taken by Mr. Carter. 
It is undisputed that Carter acted as proxy for the respondent, 
and she was undoubtedly bound by his vote. If Carter was his 
mother's proxy his vote was her legal act. The vote is the 
significant legal act, not what Carter might have said after 
the stockholders' meeting adjourned. 
The failure of this Court to recognize the fundamental 
rule that the vote of the stockholders present at a legally called 
meeting as recorded on the official minutes of the corporation 
establish the legal rights of the parties was serious error which 
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justifies the granting of· a ·rehearing in this case. The statement 
in the opinion that the evidence as to what occurred at the 
meeting of May 29, 1952 (Cis hopelessly in conflict" is not 
supported by the record. The important thing which occurred, 
namely, the vote on the resolution for reorganization was 
recorded in the official minutes and in Carter's notes, and that 
vote for reorganization should have ended this lawsuit. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A DISSENTING STOCK-
HOLDER. 
As stated above, the record does not support a finding that 
the plaintiff voted against reorganization or even expressed, 
through her proxy at the stockholders' meeting, an unwilling-
ness to go along with the plan outlined · at the meeting. Her 
proxy simply refrained from voting to accept the proposed 
articles of incorporation of the new corporation. The authorities 
hold that refraining from voting constitutes assent. See 2 Cook 
on Corporation, 6th Ed. Section 671, p. 2016: 
teA stockholder who takes part in and assents to the 
action of a stockholder's meeting which authorizes a sale 
of the property to another corporation in exchange for 
stock of the latter to be issued to stockholders of the 
former cannot afterwards object thereto and demand 
cash, even though his assent was only by refraining from 
voting against the proposition.n 
See also, Carr v. Rochester etc. Co., 207 Pa. St. 392 and 
Martin v. Chute, 34 Minn. 135, 24 N. W. 353 
The record is clear that Carter did not vote against a single 
proposition. The most he did was to refrain from voting on 
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the acceptance of the new articles because the stock was assess-
able. The stock in the old corporation was also assessable so 
he had no point there. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION 
OF ESTOPPEL. 
It is evident from the op1n1on that the Court did not 
consider the question of estoppel. This is a clear case for the 
application of that principle. Here are the essential elements: 
1. The plaintiff voted for reorganization and for all of 
the propositions except the form of articles of incorporation. 
She refrained from voting on that proposition and that is 
deemed to be assent. 
2. Carter said he would take the mater of the articles 
up with his mother and v1ould notify the officers of the 
company of her attitude on the new articles. He did not com-
municate with them again. 
3. The officers, in reliance upon the favorable vote on 
reorganization and upon the silence of Carter on the matter of 
approval of the new articles, proceeded to dissolve the Utah 
corporation and to organize a new corporation. 
4. The plaintiff, although notified of the dissolution pro-
ceedings, failed to object. 
5. After standing by for more than one year and four 
months with knowledge that there was reliance upon the favor-
able vote for reorganization, the plaintiff changed her position, 
claimed she was a dissenting stockholder an~ brought suit. 
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She was clearly estopped from changing her position after 
the company had acted in reliance upon ( 1) her vote for re-
organization and ( 2) her silence in respect to the proceeding 
for dissolution. 
This Court ignored completely this obvious estoppel. 
POINT IV 
THE DIRECTORS WERE NOT GUlL TY OF A 
BREACH OF TRUST. 
The Court's brief discussion of the question of personal 
liability of the directors indicates a lack of consideration of 
certain elementary legal concepts. 
1. The ultimate source of corporate authority to act upon 
matters not delegated by the statute or the articles of incorpora-
tion, is the vote of the stockholders. 
2. The board of directors acts within the authority vested 
in it by the statute, the articles of incorporation and by the 
stockholders. 
3·. The source of power to reorganize in the manner de-
scribed in the resolution attached to the notice of the meeting 
of May 29, 1952, was action of the stockholders. 
4. In the absence of fraud the directors of a corporation 
acting under the authority of a resolution of the stockholders 
are not liable to a non-consenting stockholder. 
See 15 Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, Perm. Ed. 
page 248, Section 7166 
13 Am. Jur., Section 1225, page 1118 
89 Am. St. R. 622 
10 
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International G. N. Ry. Co. vs. Bremand, 53 Tex. 96 
Holmes v. Crane, 182 N. Y. S. 270 
3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp., Sec. 1021, p. 527 
The Court has erred in holding that the directors are 
personally liable where admittedly (a) they had no part in 
the process of reorganizing other than to recommend that it 
be done (b) the source of authority to act was the stockholders 
and (c) there is no allegation or proof of any personal fraud 
or misconduct on the part of the directors. The Court has 
apparently not considered the authorities cited above which 
were not answered or distinguished by opposing counsel or 
by the Court. 
POINTV 
THE STIPULATION WAS MISCONSTRUED 
Although the trial court's statement of the stipulation 
regarding the appraisal of the assets of the corporation is set 
forth in the opinion, this Court has failed to pro peri y construe 
it. It will be observed that it provides, ((that when that ascertain-
ment is made, the court will apply the percentage of stock held 
by this plaintiff to the total outstanding at that time, and avvard 
to her that percentage of all assets as found by the three 
. '' appratsers ... 
This, in plain language, is that the award will be against 
the corporation for a percentage of the assets. There is no 
nzention in the stipulation of a personal judgment against the 
directors. 
It was never the intention of the defendants to waive their 
defense in the case. In fact the case had been submitted on the 
question as to whether there could be any recovery at all. See 
11 
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TraRs. pp.- 111 and 173. Evidence was not offered on the 
question of damages and the stipulation was the substitute for 
that. On page -177 of the- transcript appears the following: 
t(Mr. Skeen: There is no ruling made. 
The Courf: No ruling made. 
Mr. Skeen: -pending that. 
The Court: That's right . . . " 
The argument was made that because of the large amount 
of the appraisal (more than double the highest price ever paid 
for the stock of the Ellison Ranching Company) the appellants 
were not satisfied and that they are nhedging" on their stipu-
lation. The appellants have never repudiated the stipulation 
but have contended that ( 1) the appraisal was not properly 
made but consisted simply of an arbitrary guess (See pages 
22 and 23 of appellants' brief) and (2) the Court did not 
follow the stipulation as it simply provides for an naward to 
her (of) that percentage of all assets as found by the three 
appraisers." If the stipulation is to be followed fair play de-
mands that it be followed as stated in the record. It is not fair 
to read into the stipulation something that is not there-namely 
an agreement for a personal money judgment against the 
directors. 
That the appraisal was arbitrary becomes evident upon a 
perusal of pages 217 to 228 of the Record (Trans. 107-118). 
Mr. Morris H. Ellison testified as to the practical difficulties 
and large expense involved in gathering the livestock for sale. 
Mr. Ellison testified that the estimated expense of gathering 
the cattle would run from $100,000 to $150,000 and in addition 
there would be the cost of transporting and marketing them. 
There would, in case of liquidation, be a commission on the 
sale of land and livestock. The appraisers estimated the cost 
12 
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of gathering at $8,500 and included no item at all for trans-
portation and selling costs. The unfairness of the appraisal is 
very obvious after reading Mr. Ellison's testimony. No basis 
for arriving at the number of animal units or the value per 
unit appears in the record. After hearing testimony the Court 
made some adjustments but they were entirely inadequate in 
view of Mr. Ellison's testimony. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT IGNORED THE WELL SETTLED LAW 
AS TO DAMAGES. 
The rule as to the measure of damages in cases like the 
one before the Court is well stated in 13 American Juris-
prudence, Section 1232, pages 1120-1121. 
((The view has been taken that the market value of the 
stock governs in determining the appraisement of pre-
ferred shares on consolidation or merger and not a 
speculative value obtained by estimating the value of 
the several properties and rights of the corporation and 
dividing the same by the number of shares so as to 
obtain the value of each share." 
(Emphasis added) 
See also, Annotation 8 7 A. L. R. 602 
The Court did not either follow the stipulation as pointed 
out above or follow the law. This Court has affirmed the 
decree without consideration of all of the facts and without 
application of the law discussed above. 
It is respectfully submitted that the petition for rehearing 
should be granted. 
J.D. SKEEN 
F. R. BAYLE 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Appelants 
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